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IN THE SUPREME C01URT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHYLLIS ADAMSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellamt, 
-vs.-
~~Dnn~ JOE ADAMSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 11033 
I 
STATEJl\lEN'l1 OF FACTS 
Plaintiff sued defendant for divorce on October 22, 
19GG ( R. l through 3). D('f endant answered and filed a 
Counterclaim (R. 6-8). A hearing was held on November 
~3, 1966, with respect to the payment of temporary ali-
mony, support money and attorney's fees, which resulted 
in an order that "defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff's 
attorney the snm of $50.00 as temporary attorney's fee" 
( H. l 1, l 2). On DecPmlwr 29, 1966, plaintiff filed a Reply 
1(1 ConntNclairn (R 1ri) and tlH• day following served 
disc-ov<·ry pl<•adings on df•f<·n<lant (H, 13, 14). On Dccem 
ll<'l' :n, 19G(i, plaintiff died a:,.; a re~rnlt of an automobile 
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accident ( H. -1:.J-). D('fendant did not pay tlH• attorn<·y't; 
fees despite' demands on dvf<•ndant's attorney January 
21, 19()/ and Fehrua1y 9, 19G7, b.v letter and vhorn~ call, 
res1iedively (R rn, R. -±-!:). 
On March 13, 19G7, an Order to ::::llww Cause issued a:-, 
to why the deft:•ndant should not lJay plaintiff's attorney 
the sum of $50.00 ordered paid November 30, 196G, imr-
suant to the hearing of N ovPmber 23, 190G, and an addi-
tional fee for services sineP that date (R. 22). A judgment 
of $51.00 for the nse and benefit of plaintiff's attorney 
resulted therefrom on April 3, 1967 (R. 2:3). On l\lay 11, 
1967, ga1·nislnnent issued on the above order and judg-
ment (R. 2-±). On l\Iay 17, 1967, defendant filed a motion 
to dissolve the abov<::' garni8hment and enjoin further 
proceedings on the basis that the dPfendant had filed n 
Petition in Bankruptcy in the United Stat<'::> Distrid 
Court for the Central District of Utah in Ca;:;e No. B-51-±-
67 and that the judgmPnt for attorney's fops was subject 
to dismissal in that action. Defendant's motion resulted 
in the Amended 01·der from which plaintiff amwals (R. 
36, 37) after a heamg held August '.22, 1967. rrlte Amended 
Order provides as follows: 
''111 IS HEREBY ORDERI£D that garnish-
ment plaeed uvon defendant's pay check, and now 
pending, is qua::>h<·cl, and garnishment to be re-
leasPd and plaintiff\; attorney, Robert B. 1-Jamwn, 
is hcn•by Pnjoirn•d from is:-ming ~lll)T fnrth<'r gar-
nislt11H•nt or P:\<•e11tions against dd<'ndant on jwlg 
ments heretofore n·1Hler<c•d in this case." 
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Prior to the Pntry of the Amended Order, plaintiff's 
atlonwy rnadl~ a motion to be interpleaded in this case 
ns of Deeemher W, 19G(), to assert his rights as the real 
part:-· in interest ·with respect to the temporary order of 
eonnsd fees of N owrnlwr 30, 19iiG, and the judgment of 
April, 19G7, (R. 4-5 ). Said motion was taken under advise-
nient (R. -Hi) and by implication denied, the same not 
having been granted in the order appealed from. 
srl'A'TEJ\fENT OF POINT 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY HAS A JUDGMENT LIEN 
ON THE JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY COUNSEL FEES 
AND FINAL COUNSEL FEES AND HAS A RIGHT TO EN-
FORCE THE SAME BY GARNISHMENT OR EXECUTION. 
AHGU~JENT 
Defendant'::-; counsel urged at the hearing on this 
c·asP that a decision of this Court in the c.ase of Albrecht-
sen r .. AlfJrechtsrn, 18 Ut. 2d 55, -11± P.2d 970, was con-
trnlling and the sole issue in this 'Case is whether or not 
it is. 
In that casP, it is evident that a dispute existed be-
tw<'en tlw plaintiff there and her former attorney as to 
whetltPr the latter had been paid for his services for 
wl1ich tlH' ;judgment for attorney's fees ·was entered. 
rl'lien~ is no such dispuk in this case. In addition, and 
to n•mon' any possibility of a conflict as to such between 
the (.'statP of plaintiff and lwr attorney in this case, a mo-
tion wa:-; rnad(~ for int<~rplPader as suggested in the case 
rdvned to above. 
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Although the statutes and rules relative to garnish-
ments do not expressly treat the question as to whether 
or not the 1attorney for whose benefit a judgment is 
entered can it:isue .garnishment thereon, Rule G4D (h2) 
provides: 
"After Judgment. After the entry of judg-
ment, the clerk of any court from which execution 
thereon may be issued shall, upon request of the 
judgment creditor, issue a writ of garnishment 
and no affivadit or undertaking shall be necessary 
as a condition therefor." 
If the attorney is in fact the judgment creditor since 
he is the one for whose benefit the judgment is granted, , 
then he is the proper party for issuance of that ·writ. 
Our statute for authorizing such payment is 30-3-3 
UCA (1953) which reads as follows: 
"Temporary alimony and suit money. The 
court may order either party to pay the clerk a 
sum of money for the separate support and main-
tenance of the adverse party and the children, and 
to enable such part,\- to prosecute or defend th(' 
action."· 
Our t:it1atute is essentially the same as New York'~ 
therefore since both rnakP such awards discretionary. 
[n 8irki11 1· .. S'irki11, 2;)9 N.Y.8. 2 485 (April, 1965), 
the trial eonrt d<•ni<•d plaintiff'~ attorney~ motion for 
judgment for f<•Ps after tlH~ir n•eoneiliation on tlH1 ground 
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that tl1e application was improper sinep it n~qnired enti·y 
ol' judgment in favor of one \\'ho is not a party to the 
<Wt ion. That <kcision was n·v<•rsed on ap1wal. 
See. 237 (a) of tlw .:\ew York statute applied in the 
alioY<' ea::-;c' provides that: 
"In any action ... (2) for a separation ... 
the c:ourt may direct the husband to pay such 
sum or sums of money to enable the wife to earry 
on or defend tlw aetion ... as in the Court's dis-
erdion justiee rnquin•s, having regard to the cir-
cumstance of the ease and of the respective par-
ties. 8uch din•ction must be made in the final 
judgment in such aetion.'' 
'L'lH~ l\ ew York Court eitcd above stated: 
"'J1lrn final judg11wnt of separation in this case 
provides for direct paynwnt by the husband to the 
wife's attorneys. 
''Objection, if any, to direct payment should 
have been made at the time of the entry of the 
ch•eision on judguwnt or hy ~way of appeal from 
it. No ohjPdion having heen made, the dired 
manner of pay11wnt now stands as the law of the 
case." (citing east's) 
"No eircmnstances of the husband have been 
cl<>monstrnted to rebut thP pri111({ facic debt owed 
li.\· him undPr this judgment. 
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. "In these circumstancf's, the discretion vested 
m the Court will not be exercised in favor of a re-
conciliated couple who turn their backs on attor-
news who have in good faith rendered services for 
which the husband has already properly been 
found liable." 
It has been the practice of the 8alt Lake County 
Clerk's office to inquire as to whether a garnishment 
issued in a divorce case is for attorney's fees and if so '. ' 
to have a notation made thereon (see upper righthand 
corner of R. 24, R. 3). 
It is submitted that m the absence of controlling 
statutes and cases that this appeal must be resolved as 
a matter of policy. 
Although a judgment for attorney's fees is for the 
purpose of assisting the party to pay her attorney's fees 
and is, therefore, for her benefit also, the attorney is the 
real party in interest as the wording of the judgments 
normally indicate. If the party pays her attorney's fees, 
however, she is, of course, entitled to demand payment of 
the judgment from the defendant and such was the case 
cited above, or at least there was a claim that such wa~ 
the case. Here, however, the fear of the defendant that hr 
could be made to pay the judgment twice if the same is 
not paid to plaintiff's estate is illusory since the defen(l-
ant can certainly n•quin• a satisfaction of the judgment 
upon its payment. 8m·el)-, tlw power of the eourt to 
discipline its officers for wrongful misconduct in the 
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('vent an attorney should unscrupulously exact double 
payment should be ~mfficient protection to the party's 
(~state as a matter of policy. At least, it is submitted 
that this would be a preferable policy than to require a 
probate administration of an estate whose assets are less 
than the costs of court necessary to commence and con-
clude such a proceeding, the only suggestion offered by 
defendanes attorney. 
c(~rtainly, it should be the policy of the law that 
iiayments of obligations onght to be made by those re-
quired to pay the same to the party entitled to the pay-
ment with the least amount of difficulty and expense 
counnen:surate \vith any safeguards necessary for the 
prntedion of all concerned. 
~With respect to the fact of plaintiff's death after the 
Pntry of one ;judgment and before the other, it is submit-
tPd that if plaintiff's attorney has the right to i'ssue gar-
nishment for pa,yment of his fees on his own initiative 
during her lifetime, he would not logically be prohibited 
from doing so upon her death. As to the judgment en-
tPred after mv death it should be noted that no que<Stion . ' 
of conflict between counsel and client a.rising out of the 
dee<~dent paying for those services could arise and that 
111<· 1'ud<r11k•nt entered at that time could only be for the 
. b 
IH·1H•fit of plaintiff's attorney and the defendant having 
fai !Pd to a1Jpeal from the entry thereof, cannot properly 
nulli f\ its entry in the manner involved here. 
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It is respectfull:- submitted that the denial to plaill-
tiff's attorney of tht> i·ight to <>nforce payment of the 




and enjoining furtlwr issuances of the sa11u_• is not n1 
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quired by Ott> statutes of this state, hy rule of court, by 
decision of this court, and is contrary to justice and tlw 
ordt>r appealed from ::-;hould be yacated and the lower 
court should lw direct<>d to have• thP sums in qlwstioll 
llutdP payahk• to the dPrk of thP court and to be receivtrd 
for by p}aintiff\; attorm·:- i'n accordance with 8ec. ;)U-3-~l, 
UCA 1953. 
Robert B. Hansen, for 
HANSEN, l\fADSEN, 
RANQUIST & FRE:E:BAlHN 
Attorneys at Lau; 
330 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
